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TAKING THEOLOGY SERIOUSLY: THE STATUS OF
THE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS OF JUDICIAL
NOMINEES FOR THE FEDERAL BENCHt
FRANcIs J. BECKWITH*
INTRODUCTION
Nominees to the federal bench, like all citizens, have beliefs.
These beliefs include everything from what they were taught in
law school to what they know about history or mathematics or
what they may have learned in church or synagogue. And yet, it
is the latter beliefs that are singled out for special scrutiny by the
United States Senators who have the constitutional duty of advice
and consent in the appointment of federal judges.1
I believe there are three reasons for this. First, the issues
that are often associated with what have come to be known as the
culture warsZ-abortion,3 human sexuality,4 and origins'-have
t On November 9, 2005, the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public
Policy hosted a symposium entitled The Religious Commitments of Judicial
Nominees. Mr. Beckwith was the third speaker at the Symposium. His remarks
have been revised for publication. See also D'Army Bailey, The Religious Com-
mitments ofJudicial Nominees-Address by Judge Bailey (Nov. 9, 2005), in 20
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 443 (2006); Matthew J. Franck, The
Unbearable Unimportance of the Catholic Moment in Supreme Court History
(Nov. 9, 2005), in 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 447 (2006).
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the J. M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies, Baylor University. Fellow
and Faculty Affiliate, Center for Religious Inquiry Across the Disciplines
(CRIAD), Baylor University. Ph.D., M.A. (philosophy), Fordham University;
M.J.S. (Master of Juridical Studies), Washington University School of Law, St.
Louis.
1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
2. SeeJAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE
AMERICA (1991).
3. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
For analyses of these opinions and/or their reasoning, see HADLEY ARKES, FIRST
THINGS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND JUSTICE 327-422
(1986); RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 102-78 (1994); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE,
ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990); FrancisJ. Beckwith, Roe v. Wade:
Its Logic and Its Legacy, S. BAPTIST J. THEOLOGY, Summer 2003, at 4.
4. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). For a high-level exchange
on the question of homosexuality and marriage, see the following articles: Had-
ley Arkes, Questions of Principle, Not Predictions: A Reply to Macedo, 84 GEO. L.J. 321
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been elevated by the federal courts to questions that are implic-
itly covered by the principles of the U.S. Constitution. Second,
these same questions are addressed by a number of religious tra-
ditions that provide contrary answers to the ones given by the
federal judiciary. Third, it seems to me that most of the U.S.
Senators who appear concerned about a nominee's religious
beliefs-or what are sometimes called "personal" or "deeply-held
beliefs" 6-do not believe that these religious beliefs could ever
be items of real knowledge and thus are not legitimate points of
view that fall under the umbrella of what many political philoso-
phers call "public reason."7 Hence, what some U.S. Senators fear
is that a federal judge or Supreme Courtjustice confirmed under
their watch may employ the deliverances of her theological tradi-
tion and provide in her judicial opinions contrary answers to the
(1995); Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal Imagina-
tion, 84 GEO. L.J. 301 (1995); Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conserva-
tive Mind, 84 GEO. LJ. 261 (1995); Stephen Macedo, Reply to Critics, 84 GEO. L.J.
329 (1995).
5. I am referring to the policy questions arising from the teaching of
evolution in public schools. See McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255
(E.D. Ark. 1982); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). For differing views
on these cases and the issue of evolution and public education, see Francis J.
Beckwith, Public Education, Religious Establishment, and the Challenge of Intelligent
Design, 17 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 461 (2003); Kent Greenawalt,
Establishing Religious Ideas: Evolution, Creationism, and Intelligent Design, 17 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'v 321 (2003); Jay D. Wexler, Darwin, Design, and
Disestablishment: Teaching the Evolution Controversy in Public Schools, 56 VAND. L.
REv. 751 (2003).
6. Columnist Charles Krauthammer provides this example:
[William] Pryor has more recently been attacked from a different
quarter. Senate Democrats have blocked his nomination to the 11th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals on the grounds of his personal beliefs.
"His beliefs are so well known, so deeply held," charged his chief
antagonist, Sen. Charles Schumer [D-NY], "that it's very hard to
believe-very hard to believe-that they're not going to deeply influ-
ence the way he comes about saying, 'I will follow the law."'
An amazing litmus test: Deeply held beliefs are a disqualification
for high judicial office. Only people of shallow beliefs (like Schu-
mer?) need apply.
Of course, Schumer's real concern is with the content of Pryor's
beliefs. Schumer says that he would object to "anybody who had very,
very deeply held views." Anybody? If someone had deeply held views
in favor of abortion rights, you can be sure that Schumer would not be
blocking his nomination. Pryor is being pilloried because he openly
states (1) that Roe v. Wade was a constitutional abomination, and (2)
that abortion itself is a moral abomination.
Charles Krauthammer, A Judge Prejudged, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2003, at A23
(emphasis added).
7. See, e.g., NATURAL LAW AND PUBLIC REASON (Robert P. George & Chris-
topher Wolfe eds., 2000); JOHN RAwLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
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questions that these senators believe have already been correctly
settled by public reason. Given this conclusion, I will suggest a
solution that treats theology with epistemological respect while at
the same time allaying some, though I suspect not all, of the fears
expressed by some U.S. Senators.
I. THEOLOGY AS A KNOWLEDGE-TRADITION
Imagine that a member of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee were to ask a nominee for the federal bench the following
question: "Would you permit what you've learned about science,
mathematics, professional ethics, or history to influence the judg-
ments you will make on this court?" Many of us would find this
to be an odd question, since we would think the question almost
impossible to answer in any definitive way unless we had specific
knowledge of an actual case in which the judge's knowledge in
these areas of study would be relevant to his judgment. We
would, however, concede that there could be cases in which the
judge's background beliefs may, and sometimes ought to, shape
his or her judgments.
For example, in a famous exchange between contrary opin-
ions in the case of Rosenberger v. Virginia,8 Justices Thomas9 and
Souter' ° sparred over differing interpretations and applications
of James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments." Each offered what he believed was the correct his-
torical understanding of the meaning of Madison's famous essay.
We think this perfectly appropriate even if it turns out that one
of the justices is mistaken. Illustrations from science, mathemat-
ics, economics, and professional ethics are easy to come by as
well. To cite but one illustration, in a well-known article on the
use and misuse of probability theory by advocates and courts, 2
Lawrence Tribe cites a California Supreme Court case in which
"the court ruled improper a prosecutor's misconceived attempt
to link an accused interracial couple with a robbery by using
probability theory. ' 13 However, as Tribe notes, the court "dis-
cerned 'no inherent incompatibility between the disciplines of
8. Rosenberger v. Rectors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
9. Id. at 852-63 (Thomas, J., concurring).
10. Id. at 863-99 (Souter, J., dissenting).
11. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS
ASSESSMENTS (1785), reprinted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63-72
(1947) (RutledgeJ., dissenting).
12. Lawrence Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1329 (1971).
13. Id. at 1334-38 (citing People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33 (Ca. 1978)). As
Tribe points out, the California Supreme Court, in overturning a conviction,
20061
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law and mathematics and intend [ed] no general disapproval...
of the latter as an auxiliary in the fact-finding processes of the
former.' "14
We do not consider these examples troubling because we
correctly believe that certain disciplines and areas of study-such
as history and mathematics-are knowledge-traditions whose
deliverances provide us with insights that may be useful to a
court in a particular case, even when those well-versed in any of
these traditions-as the Souter/Thomas debate clearly shows-
strongly disagree with each other
Theology, however, is a different matter. For many people,
including, I suspect, most members of the U.S. Senate, theologi-
cal beliefs are not part of a knowledge tradition. These beliefs
are labeled as personal and private, which means they are episte-
mologically on the level of matters of taste or preference. That
is, they may be fine for you, but they cannot, in principle, serve as
a resource from which one may actually acquire knowledge that
may positively contribute to one's professional responsibility as a
judge or even as an elected official.
This understanding is so much a part of the philosophical
infrastructure of our public culture that we think nothing of it
when it is presented to us in policy discussions. Take, for exam-
ple, the 2004 speech given by Ron Reagan, the son of the late
U.S. President Ronald W. Reagan, at the Democratic National
Convention in Boston.1 5  Commenting on Americans who
oppose embryonic stem-cell research, the younger Reagan
argued:
Now, there are those who would stand in the way of
this remarkable future, who would deny the federal fund-
ing so crucial to basic research. They argue that interfer-
ing with the development of even the earliest stage
embryo, even one that will never be [sic] implanted in a
womb and will never develop into an actual fetus, is tanta-
mount to murder .... [M]any are well-meaning and sin-
cere. Their belief is just that, an article of faith, and they
are entitled to it.
But it does not follow that the theology of a few should
be allowed to forestall the health and well-being of the
corrected the prosecutor's use of probability theory by employing mathematics
and other extra-legal conceptual notions.
14. Id. at 1337 (quoting Collins, 438 P.2d at 33).
15. Ron Reagan, Speech Before the Democratic National Convention
(July 29, 2004), available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/
nation/president/2004-07-29-reagan-speech-text x.htm.
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many. And how can we affirm life if we abandon those
whose own lives are so desperately at risk?
16
For the younger Reagan, one's theological tradition can
never in principle trump the goals of "health" and "well-being."
Perhaps realizing that these terms and their meanings cannot be
understood and known apart from more fundamental beliefs
about human beings and their nature, Reagan offers an account
of the value of nascent life that sequesters early embryos from the
class of moral subjects. He maintains that early embryos "are
not, in and of themselves, human beings,"17 since they lack cer-
tain characteristics: they "have no fingers and toes, no brain or
spinal cord. They have no thoughts, no fears. They feel no
pain."'" And because the cells that make up the tiny bodies of
these early embryos have yet to develop into the cells of particu-
lar organs or systems (i.e., they have not differentiated), an early
embryo conceived in a laboratory, so that researchers may use its
stem-cells, is merely "undifferentiated cells multiplying in a tissue
culture" and not "a living, breathing person-a parent, a spouse,
a child."' 9
Ironically, by classifying early embryos as morally outside the
circle of legal protection, Ron Reagan enters the arena of theo-
logical exploration on a question of philosophical anthropol-
ogy.20 He chooses to answer a question of scholarly interest to
theologians and philosophers ("What is man?") in order tojustify
a particular act (the killing of embryos). He refers to the posi-
tion of his adversaries as "an article of faith," even though he
chooses to answer precisely the same question ("What is man?")
his adversaries answer. His adversaries' answer justifies forbid-
ding the same act Reagan seeks to permit, killing early embryos.
As anyone familiar with the literature on this subject will tell you,
those who defend the position that the unborn are persons from
conception offer reasons that are parts of arguments with conclu-





20. "Philosophical anthropology" deals with questions about the nature
of human beings, such as what constitutes a human being, whether human
beings have immaterial natures, souls, or minds, and/or whether the absence
or presence of those attributes or properties determines a human being's status
as a moral subject.
21. See, e.g., PATRICK LEE, ABORTION AND UNBORN HUMAN LIFE (1996); J.
P. MORELAND & SCOTT B. RAE, BODY & SOUL: HUMAN NATURE AND THE CRISIS IN
ETHICS (2000); THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, HUMAN CLONING AND
HUMAN DIGNITY: AN ETHICAL INQUIRY 258-66 (2002) (personal statement of
2006]
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advocates, articles of faith,22 but they are also, in the considered
judgments of these thoughtful citizens, deliverances of reason as
well. 23 Surely, these citizens may be mistaken about the strength
Council Member Robert P. George (joined by Council Member Alfonso
G6mez-Lobo)); STEPHEN SCHWARZ, THE MORAL QUESTION OF ABORTION (1990);
Francis J. Beckwith, Law, Religion, and the Metaphysics of Abortion: A Reply to Sim-
mons, 43J. CHURCH & ST. 19 (2001); FrancisJ. Beckwith, When You Come to a Fork
In the Road, Take It?: Abortion, Personhood, and the Jurisprudence of Neutrality, 45J.
CHURCH & ST. 485 (2003); Francis J. Beckwith, The Explanatory Power of the Sub-
stance View of Persons, 10 CHRISTAN BIOETHICS 33 (2004); Patrick Lee, The Prolife
Argument from Substantial Identity: A Defense, 18 BIOETHICS 249 (2004); Patrick
Lee & Robert P. George, The Wrong of Abortion, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN
APPLIED ETHICS 13 (Andrew I. Cohen & Christopher Wellman eds., 2005).
22. In fact, the Thomistic tradition within Christian theology supports the
notion that some truths of faith may also be truths of reason. As I pointed out
elsewhere:
For Aquinas, there are things that can be known by reason, things
that can be known by faith, and things that can be known by both or
either. For example, the periodic table can be known by reason, the
Trinity can be known only by special revelation (faith), and God's exis-
tence can be known by reason (the Five Ways) and faith (revelation),
though things known by faith alone can never be contrary to reason.
There is no two-tier view of knowledge for Aquinas, for objects of faith
are truly known and may count against someone's apparent deliver-
ances of "reason," and it is the job of the philosopher to show that
such deliverances are in fact against reason.
The difference between objects of faith and objects of reason for
Aquinas is not in their status as objects of knowledge, but in how the
knowledge is acquired by the human mind. Take, for example, the
case of God's existence and nature. According to Aquinas, one can
know through reason that there is an eternally existing necessary and
personal agent that is the first cause of all that contingently exists. But
that such a being is a Trinity-three persons and one eternal sub-
stance-is something revealed in special revelation, Scripture, and is
not the result of the deliverances of reason. Still, in rebutting the
charge that the Trinity is against reason, the philosopher may offer
conceptual clarity to the skeptic and show that the doctrine is not
incoherent or irrational. In that sense, the philosopher is showing
that that which is known by faith (the Trinity) is not contrary to rea-
son, even as he maintains that God's existence is known by both rea-
son and faith and is thus contrary to neither.
Francis J. Beckwith, What's Upstairs?, FIRST THINGS, Nov. 2004, at 51, 54-55
(reviewing NANCY PEARCEY, TOTAL TRUTH (2004)).
23. For example, many defenders of the early embryo's personhood have
offered strong counter-arguments to the sort of case the younger Reagan
offered in 2004. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 21. None of these counter-
arguments appeal to sacred scripture or religious authority. Rather, they offer
reasons that can be fully understood by skeptics such as Reagan. To take but
one example of what I mean, Reagan denies that the early embryo is a moral
subject because it cannot think and it does not have external features (e.g.,
hands, feet) we associate with more mature members of the human species.
First, concerning the latter, one could reply that external features carry no
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of their arguments, but they are in no worse a position epistemo-
logically than Ron Reagan and those who offer different reasons
for a contrary position, since they too may be mistaken about the
strength of their arguments. In my opinion, it is only because
the younger Reagan and his allies do not consider theological
beliefs as belonging to a knowledge-tradition that they can dis-
miss a priori theologically informed policy proposals as de facto
epistemologically inferior to so-called secular ones, even when
secular ones answer precisely the same questions as do the so-
called "articles of faith." The younger Reagan and his allies offer
no reasons for this epistemological apartheid, since they know
that convincing their peers that a view is or may be "religious"
relieves them of their epistemic duty to rationally assess that view
as a serious contender to the deliverances of so-called "secular
reason."
24
moral weight, because (1) external features are relative to a human being's
development but do not change its nature, and (2) the early embryo has pre-
cisely the correct external features that all human beings have at that time in
their development. Second, the absence or presence of thinking does not
change the nature of human beings. All human beings can think by nature, but
some of them lack the present capacity to exercise that natural power either (1)
because of immaturity (as in the case of the early embryo), or (2) because of
illness (as in the case of a temporarily comatose person), or (3) because of
congenital defect (as in the case of the anencephalic child). But these lacks all
testify to the nature of the being in question, that it is in fact one of us, and
ought to be treated with dignity and respect. There are much more sophisti-
cated responses to Reagan-type arguments, but this is not the place to present
them. Nevertheless, this example gives the reader a feel for the sorts of replies
that have been in the literature for quite some time and which the younger
Reagan has apparently not entertained or engaged.
24. Ironically, Reagan's father, in a 1983 article, answered his son's argu-
ment over two decades before the younger Reagan uttered it:
Regrettably, we live at a time when some persons do not value all
human life. They want to pick and choose which individuals have
value. Some have said that only those individuals with "consciousness
of self' are human beings. One such writer has followed this deadly
logic and concluded that "shocking as it may seem, a newly born
infant is not a human being."
A Nobel Prize winning scientist has suggested that if a handi-
capped child "were not declared fully human until three days after
birth, then all parents could be allowed the choice." In other words,
"quality control" to see if newly born human beings are up to snuff.
Obviously, some influential people want to deny that every
human life has intrinsic, sacred worth. They insist that a member of
the human race must have certain qualities before they accord him or
her status as a "human being."
Ronald Reagan, Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation, HUMAN LIFE REV.,
Spring 1983, at 7, 10, available at http://www.humanlifereview.com/reagan.
2006]
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This helps make sense of the comments of Senator John
Kerry (D-MA). While campaigning for the U.S. presidency in
2004, Senator Kerry said that he believes that human life begins
at conception, though he claimed that this belief should not be
reflected in our laws.25 If the Senator had said something similar
about another issue, such as spousal abuse, we would think his
comments incoherent. So, let us imagine that Senator Kerry had
said he believes that spousal abuse is wrong, but that this belief is
his own private, personal one, and for that reason, it would be
wrong for him to extend that belief through the law to others
who may be members of religious traditions that encourage, or at
least permit, spousal abuse. If Senator Kerry had made that
claim, we would know immediately that he does not grasp what it
means to say that an act is wrong. Why then do many of our
fellow citizens not see the same incoherency when political lead-
ers like Senator Kerry apply this reasoning to the question of
abortion? I believe it is because Senator Kerry and those who
think like him artificially separate their view of the unborn's
nature from their ordinary beliefs about the real world and place
that view in the same category in which matters of taste and pref-
erence reside. Their view of the unborn is "an article of faith"
that is not in principle a belief about the real world, and thus, it
can never count as real knowledge.
This view is sometimes called, in the words of Concordia
University professor Edward Veith, the "'two-spheres' approach,
in which faith has nothing to do with the pursuit of objective
knowledge. '' 26 For proponents of the "two-sphere" approach,
theology is not a knowledge-tradition whose deliverances may
contribute to, or count against, the deliverances of other points
of view or knowledge-traditions. 27 That is, theology ought to play
no part in the epistemological responsibilities of professionals in
whatever discipline or vocation they may pursue. This is because
theology is just a synonym for one's personal piety and religious
life, a sphere totally separate from worldly ventures.2"
25. Jonathan Finer, Kerry Says He Believes Life Starts at Conception, WASH.
POST, July 5, 2004, at A6.
26. Gene Edward Veith, Baptist Brawl, WORLD MAG., Feb. 14, 2004, at 29,
29 (describing, as opposed to promoting, this theory).
27. For an application of this perspective to the issue of abortion, see
Paul D. Simmons, Religious Liberty and Abortion Policy: Casey as 'Catch-22', 42 J.
CHURCH & ST. 69 (2000); see also Paul D. Simmons, Religious Liberty and the Abor-
tion Debate, 32J. CHURCH & ST. 567 (1990).
28. The former president of Baylor University (1981-1995), Dr. Herbert
H. Reynolds, is a champion of this view. Robert Benne writes:
Christianity, in this form of Baptist piety, includes an inevitable
moral imperative. But in one's relationship with Christ-which is
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For these scholars, questions about a judicial nominee's
religious beliefs are impolite and intrusive, since those beliefs, no
matter how devout, have no bearing on one's success as a jurist.
On the other hand, a jurist who understands her religious beliefs
as items of knowledge that contribute to her understanding of
the world, is confusing the two spheres and, as a result of that
confusion, will diminish her chances of performing well on the
bench. Consequently, a "two-spheres" jurist is not perceived as a
threat to the jurisprudential status quo, for she embraces a posi-
tion not dissimilar to the one offered by 1960 presidential candi-
date John F. Kennedy, when he addressed a group of Baptists
and assured them that nothing of his Catholic faith would play
any role in his judgments as occupant of the White House.29
II. TAKING THEOLOGY SERIOUSLY
Of course, for concerned senators the problem is with pro-
spective judges and justices who reject the two-spheres approach
and in fact believe that theology is a knowledge tradition. In
light of what I have said about theology and its epistemological
status, I would like to address their concern.
highly individual and inward-one has "soul competency." A true
Christian shares the freedom of the priesthood of each believer. This
competency and freedom compel one to read the Bible and its mean-
ings according to conscience. Nothing about the faith should be
articulated in creeds or systems of Christian thought.
"We do not believe in systematic theology," said Reynolds,
explaining his style of Baptist piety. According to his view, public artic-
ulations of systematic theology, as well as public displays of piety, par-
take in the kind of "religiosity" that Jesus condemns in Matthew 6.
Moreover, such affirmations quickly become oppressive and rob other
believers of their Christian freedom, their "soul competency."
This traditionally Baptist construal of the faith results in a particu-
lar vision of the Christian university. Some have called it the "atmos-
pheric" or "two-spheres" approach. The Christian character of the
university resides in the hospitable, friendly, caring, just and edifying
atmosphere created by sincere Christians. It also resides in the relig-
ion courses and the extracurricular religious activities that permeate
the university. But what happens in the classrooms of this kind of
Christian university is pretty much the same as what occurs in public
universities. The only difference is that the Christian professor oper-
ates out of a sense of Christian vocation. Professors are in the univer-
sity to "teach algebra, political science, the best way they know how,
which is to me the Christian way to do it," said Reynolds.
Robert Benne, Crisis of Identity: A Clash Over Faith and Learning, CHRISTIAN CEN-
TURY, Jan. 27, 2004, at 24-25.
29. John F. Kennedy, Address to the Greater Houston Ministerial Associa-
tion (Sept. 12, 1960), available at http://jfklibrary.org/j091260.htm.
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First, their concern ignores other important aspects of these
same theological traditions that in fact may contribute to a
jurist's excellence. Most of these traditions call for their practi-
tioners to be honest, law-abiding, and just in whatever vocation
they may find themselves. This means that a devout jurist from
such a tradition will strive to make judgments, as required by his
oath, based on the facts and the law, even when both may require
that he issue a ruling that is inconsistent with what he knows to
be true outside of the narrow strictures of the case under review.
For example, a jurist whose theological tradition affirms the per-
sonhood of the unborn may have no choice but to rule that a
defendant cannot be guilty of negligent homicide-and there-
fore dismiss the case-because the only fatality was a pre-viable
fetus who, under the law in the judge's jurisdiction, is not a legal
person under criminal law and thus cannot be the victim of a
homicide.3" This no more compromises a jurist's conviction that
his religious beliefs are part of a knowledge-tradition than it
would compromise his conviction that forensic science is part of
a knowledge-tradition when the law requires him to apply the
exclusionary rule in a particular case because the forensic evi-
dence was acquired illegally. So, in both cases, a jurist must issue
a ruling that is inconsistent with what he knows to be true.
Second, as I noted earlier, there are very few questions about
which a nominee's theological beliefs actually raise concerns.
These are questions about abortion, human sexuality, and ori-
gins. Ironically, they are questions to which many theological tra-
ditions offer answers contrary to the ones offered by the courts.
30. If such a case were to be appealed and the prosecutor argued that the
Fourteenth Amendment called for the states to protect the right to life of per-
sons, including pre-born human beings, under their jurisdiction, it is likely that
the court would, based on Roe v. Wade, uphold the trial court's verdict. For in
Roe, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that pre-born human beings are not
Fourteenth Amendment persons. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157-58. How-
ever, it is certainly possible that a future Supreme Court could reject this under-
standing of the Fourteenth Amendment and argue that pre-born human beings
are in fact covered by the Fourteenth Amendment. In this sort of case, as I
argue by analogy below, a justice may very well rely on the resources of his
theological tradition in order to compose an argument to support this new
interpretation. On the other hand, one can imagine a strong originalist, such
as Justice Antonin Scalia, who, though believing his theology is a knowledge-
tradition, rejects the new interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment because
abortion had been a matter of health and morals whose regulation had been
exclusively left to state governments until Roe v. Wade in 1973. My point is this:
one's overarching judicial philosophy may have more to do with one's applica-
tion of the law in particular cases than one's theological beliefs, even if one
maintains that those beliefs are part of a knowledge tradition. See infra note 33
for the text of Robert P. George's comment.
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If, in fact, the courts, with the encouragement of an army of
activist groups, law professors, and legislators, had not provided
answers that depend on the veracity of a controversial metaphys-
ics that implies the falsity of most theological traditions that
claim to be knowledge-traditions," there would be no contro-
versy. Instead of providing a real legal rationale for their opin-
ions on these matters, one that relies on the proper scope of the
31. Take, for example, the comments of law professor Steven G. Gey, who
offers the following judgments about the veracity of theological claims, their
attendant moral notions, and their application to our understanding of natural
rights. Take special notice that he places theological beliefs in the realm of
matters of taste and preference:
The establishment clause should be viewed as a reflection of the secu-
lar, relativist political values of the Enlightenment, which are incom-
patible with the fundamental nature of religious faith. As an
embodiment of these Enlightenment values, the establishment clause
requires that the political influence of religion be substantially dimin-
ished .... Religious belief and practice should be protected under the
first amendment, but only to the same extent and for the same reason
that all other forms of expression and conscience are protected-
because the first amendment prohibits government from enacting
into law any religious, political, or aesthetic orthodoxy.
Steven G. Gey, Why is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion
Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. Pit-r. L. REv. 75, 79 (1990).
Elsewhere, Professor Gey elaborates: "[R]eligious principles are not based on
logic or reason, and, therefore, may not be proved or disproved." Id. at 167.
Finally, Gey remarks:
[W]hereas religion asserts that its principles are immutable and abso-
lutely authoritative, democratic theory asserts just the opposite. The
sine qua non of any democratic state is that everything political is
open to question; not only specific policies and programs, but the very
structure of the state itself must always be subject to challenge. Democ-
racies are by nature inhospitable to political or intellectual stasis or
certainty. Religion is fundamentally incompatible with this intellec-
tual cornerstone of the modern democratic state. The irreconcilable
distinction between democracy and religion is that, although there
can be no sacrosanct principles or unquestioned truths in a democ-
racy, no religion can exist without sacrosanct principles and unques-
tioned truths.
Id. at 174.
Professor Gey's comments are rife with philosophical incoherence. To cite
but one example, he states that "no religion can exist without sacrosanct princi-
ples and unquestioned truths," but right before that he asserts that "the sine
qua non of any democratic state is that everything political is open to question,"
which is to say that this is a sacrosanct principle essential to a democratic state.
Id. But we are nevertheless told by Professor Gey that "there can be no sacro-
sanct principles or unquestioned truths in a democracy." Id. What Professor
Gey is offering his readers is self-referentially incoherent, hardly the sort of
thing one expects from a scholar who condescendingly, and without proof or
argument, claims that "religious principles are not based on logic or rea-
son ..... Id. at 167.
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state's police powers and the limits of the Constitution, some
jurists chose to engage in the sort of philosophizing that requires
that they issue negative judgments about the theological meta-
physics of their neighbors. 2 If some senators fear theologically
serious jurists on the federal bench, it is only because secular lib-
eral jurists, serious about their own metaphysical commitments,
employed their influence and juridical power to place in the law
their own philosophical understandings. In other words, it is not
that some senators fear jurists answering theological questions
32. Take, for example, the comments of Justice John Paul Stevens, who
criticizes the preamble of a Missouri statute that states that human life begins at
conception:
Indeed, I am persuaded that the absence of any secular purpose for
the legislative declarations that life begins at conception and that con-
ception occurs at fertilization makes the relevant portion of the pre-
amble invalid under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
to the Federal Constitution. This conclusion does not, and could not,
rest on the fact that the statement happens to coincide with the tenets
of certain religions, or on the fact that the legislators who voted to
enact it may have been motivated by religious considerations. Rather,
it rests on the fact that the preamble, an unequivocal endorsement of
a religious tenet of some but by no means all Christian faiths, serves no
identifiable secular purpose. That fact alone compels a conclusion
that the statute violates the Establishment Clause.
Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 566-67, (1989) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted). He later adds:
As a secular matter, there is an obvious difference between the state
interest in protecting the freshly fertilized egg and the state interest in
protecting a 9-month-gestated, fully sentient fetus on the eve of birth.
There can be no interest in protecting the newly fertilized egg from
physical pain or mental anguish, because the capacity for such suffer-
ing does not yet exist; respecting a developed fetus, however, that
interest is valid.
Id. at 569.
Justice Stevens first asserts that the belief that a human begins at concep-
tion is religious, and then claims that "as a secular matter" the state has no
interest in protecting a pre-sentient fetus. This is a perfect illustration of the
view that theology is not a knowledge tradition: Justice Stevens thinks that to
identify a belief as a religious tenet means that it could not in principle count as
an item of knowledge capable of defeating the deliverances of "secular reason."
But what is really curious is that whatJustice Stevens offers as "a secular matter,"
that there is no prima facie wrong in killing a pre-sentient human being,
depends on a philosophical anthropology that is tied to a view of the world that
answers the same question that traditional religions attempt to answer, i.e.,
What property or properties must a being possess in order to be considered a
subject of moral concern, and thus requires legal protection? Justice Stevens
provides an answer to this question: full sentience is the property a human
being must possess in order for the law to be justified in recognizing it as a
being worthy of legal protection. But, ironically, like a stereotypical religious
believer, Justice Stevens dogmatically stipulates this answer and provides no rea-
sons for why anyone should believe it is true.
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from the bench, it is that they fear answers that they believe are
heretical, that are not consistent with what these senators deem
are unassailable beliefs about what is good, true, and beautiful.
Still, there would be very few cases, even those that concern
the culture-war questions, that would permit a jurist to employ
the resources of her theological beliefs even if she maintains that
those beliefs are part of a knowledge-tradition. For such theologi-
cally serious jurists are typically drawn from religious traditions
that embrace an understanding of the rule of law, fundamental
rights, representative democracy, civic republicanism, separation
of powers, and constitutional government that entails juridical
modesty and judicial restraint.3" Precisely because these jurists
are theologically serious, they are unlikely to use the power of
33. Consider, for example, the remarks of Robert P. George, a theologi-
cally serious legal philosopher and political theorist:
I agree with [Edward S.] Corwin and his followers that the fabric
and theory of our Constitution embodies our founders' belief in natu-
ral law and natural rights. And while I also share their view that judi-
cial review itself emerged as part of the strategy of the founding
generation to insure governmental conformity with natural law and to
protect natural rights, I do not draw from this the conclusion that
judges have broad authority to go beyond the text, structure, logic,
and original understanding of the Constitution to invalidate legisla-
tion that, in the opinion of judges, is contrary to natural justice. On
the contrary, [Justice Hugo] Black, [Robert] Bork, [Justice Antonin]
Scalia, and other "textualists" and "originalists" are nearer the mark,
in my judgment, in calling for judicial restraint in the absence of a
clear constitutional warrant for overturning duly enacted legislation.
This is because the Constitution, as I read the document, places pri-
mary authority for giving effect to natural law and protecting natural
rights to the institutions of democratic self-government, not to the
Courts, in circumstances in which nothing in the text, its structure,
logic, or original understanding dictates an answer to a dispute as to
proper public policy. It is primarily for the state legislatures, and,
where power has been duly delegated under the Constitution, to the
Congress to fulfill the task of making law in harmony with the require-
ments of morality (natural law), including respect for valuable and
honorable liberties (natural rights).
Judicial review is, I believe, constitutionally legitimate, and can, if
exercised with proper restraint, help to make the natural law ideal of
constitutional government a reality. Courts, however, can usurp, and, I
believe, often have usurped, legislative authority under the guise of
protecting individual rights and liberties from legislative encroach-
ment. And courts can usurp, and have usurped, legislative authority in
good as well as bad causes. Whenever they do so, however, even in
good causes, they violate the rule of law by seizing power authorita-
tively allocated by the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution to other
branches of government (even if that power could, rightly, have been
allocated to them). And respect for the rule of law is itself a require-
ment of natural justice.
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their office to engage in the sort of'judicial usurpation of legisla-
tive, state, and executive powers that has marked the record of
their liberal counterparts. They will, for example, not find in the
Constitution, as the Supreme Court has found, rights to consen-
sual sodomy34 and abortion35 that trump the laws of local govern-
ments, which have the popular support of their citizenry. In
other words, because they will not use their office to exercise
powers the Constitution does not give them to place in our laws
their religious views, even though they believe those views are
true items of real knowledge, these theologically serious jurists
are far less dangerous than their liberal counterparts, who have
in fact employed their office to place in our laws answers to the
very same questions that theological traditions have offered
answers.
I can, however, imagine a case in which a judge or justice
could appropriately employ the resources of her theological tra-
dition in a way that is consistent with the rule of law and the
proper role of the federal judiciary. Consider the following fan-
ciful example, from which we can extrapolate to the contentious
issue of abortion. Suppose the Earth were visited by members of
an alien race, such as the Vulcans of Star Trek. Let's say that one
of the Vulcans, Sarek,"6 is killed as a result of what we would call
negligent homicide if Sarek were a human being. The District
Sometimes courts have no legitimate authority to set fight what
they perceive (perhaps rightly) to be a wrong; and where this is the
case, it is wrong-because usurpative-for them to do so. There is no
paradox in this. Fidelity to the rule of law imposes on public officials
in a reasonably just regime (that is, a regime that it would be wrong
for judges to attempt to subvert) a duty injustice to respect the consti-
tutional limits of their own authority. To fail in this duty, however
noble one's ends, is to behave unconstitutionally, lawlessly, unjustly.
The American founders were not utopians; they knew that the mainte-
nance of constitutional government and the rule of law would limit
the power of officials to do good as well as evil. They also knew, and we
must not forget, that to sacrifice constitutional government and com-
promise the rule of law in the hope of rectifying injustices is to strike a
bargain with the devil.
Robert P. George, Natural Law, the Constitution, and the Theory and Practice of
Judicial Review, 69 FoRDAm L. REv. 2269, 2282-83 (2001) (notes omitted).
34. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
35. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1972); see also Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 896 (1992).
36. In my public presentation of this illustration at the University of
Notre Dame on November 9, 2005, I used the Star Trek character of Spock
rather than Sarek in my example. It was, however, pointed out by the modera-
tor, Gerard V. Bradley (Professor, Notre Dame Law School), that the character
of Spock is half-human, and thus my illustration was not quite to the point. So,
this is why I employ the character of Sarek, Spock's full-Vulcan father, in this
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Attorney refuses to prosecute on the grounds that Sarek is not
protected under the negligent homicide statute, since it only
applies to human beings and Sarek is not a human being. Sup-
pose that the ACLU and the Thomas More Law Center take up
Sarek's cause and the Supreme Court eventually takes the case.
One of the Justices, a devout Catholic, argues in his majority
opinion that Sarek is in fact protected by the criminal statute
because he in fact has Fourteenth Amendment rights. He has
these rights, according to the Court, because Sarek was a being, a
person, whose nature had properties (e.g., the capacity for
rational moral agency 7 ) identical to those properties possessed
by the sorts of beings the Fourteenth Amendment was intended
to protect.
The application to the abortion controversy should be obvi-
ous: if in fact the unborn is a person, then the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to it, even if the drafters of the amendment
did not have the unborn in mind. Take, for example, the reason-
ing of a federal district court in the 1970 case Steinberg v. Brown:3
[C]ontraception, which is dealt with in Griswold, is con-
cerned with preventing the creation of a new and indepen-
dent life. The right and power of a man or a woman to
determine whether or not to participate in this process of
creation is clearly a private and personal one with which
the law cannot and should not interfere.
It seems clear, however, that the legal conclusion in
Griswold as to the rights of individuals to determine without
governmental interference whether or not to enter into
the process of procreation cannot be extended to cover
those situations wherein, voluntarily or involuntarily, the
preliminaries have ended, and a new life has begun. Once
human life has commenced, the constitutional protections
found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments impose
upon the state the duty of safeguarding it. 9
As I noted in an article published elsewhere:
What the Court in Steinberg is suggesting should be
uncontroversial: a legal principle has universal application.
So, for example, if a statute that forbids burglary became
law at a time when no computers existed, it would not fol-
published version. Special thanks to the logical Professor Bradley for cor-
recting me on this matter. May he live long and prosper.
37. See sources cited supra note 21, which defend this point of view or one
similar to it.
38. 321 F. Supp. 741, 746-47 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
39. Id. at 746.
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low that the prohibition against burglary does not apply to
computers, that one is free to burgle computers from the
homes of one's neighbors since the "original intent" of the
statute's framers did not include computers. What matters
is whether the entity stolen is property, that it is a thing that
can be owned, not whether it is a particular thing (in this
case, a computer) that the authors of the anti-burglary stat-
ute knew or did not know to be property at the time of its
passage. To employ another analogy, the religion clauses
of the First Amendment apply to religious believers whose
faiths came to be after the Constitution was ratified: a
Baha'i is protected by the First Amendment even though
the Baha'i Faith did not exist in 1789. Therefore, if the
unborn is a person, the Fourteenth Amendment is meant
to protect him or her even if the authors of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not have the unborn in mind.40
How does this differ from the California Supreme Court's
reliance on the resources of probability theory and mathematics
in People v. Collins4 to overturn a lower-court criminal conviction,
or Justice Thomas's and Justice Souter's appeal to historical
sources in order to arrive at contrary opinions about the mean-
ing and application of Madison's Remonstrance? In all these cases,
jurists are appealing to extra-legal knowledge traditions in terms
that are publicly accessible. In the cases of Sarek and Steinberg,
the courts are in fact relying on the resources of their theological
traditions (albeit, philosophically informed), but not their "pri-
vate beliefs" or "personal piety." They are offering the sorts of
reasons that one is accustomed to encountering in all knowledge
traditions. Like the California court and Justices Thomas and
Souter, they are not contravening the law. Rather, they are offer-
ing an understanding of it that extracts from it legal principles
that are subsequently applied to a new case for which these prin-
ciples are well-suited, even though their earliest defenders did
not anticipate this application.
4 2
40. Beckwith, supra note 3, at 12. For a debate on the application of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the unborn, see Nathan Schlueter & Robert H.
Bork, Constitutional Persons: An Exchange on Abortion, FIRST THINGS, Jan. 2003, at
28. Thank you to James R. Stoner (Professor of Political Science, Louisiana
State University) for bringing the Schlueter/Bork exchange to my attention.
41. 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968).
42. Two Protestant scholars-Alvin Plantinga (University of Notre Dame)
and J. P. Moreland (Biola University)-and two Catholic scholars-Robert P.
George (Princeton University) and Pope Benedict XVI-have been instrumen-
tal in helping me to understand and defend the notion of theology as a knowl-
edge-tradition. Among their many works, I recommend the following: ROBERT
P. GEORGE, THE CLASH OF ORTHODOXIES: LAW, RELIGION, AND MORAITY' IN CRI-
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sis (2001);J.P. MORELAND, LOVE YOUR GOD WITH ALL YOUR MIND: THE ROLE OF
REASON IN THE LIFE OF THE SOUL (1997); ALVIN PLANTINGA, WARRANTED CHRIS-
TIAN BELIEF (2000); JOSEPH RATZINGER [now POPE BENEDICT XVI], TRUTH AND
TOLERANCE: CHRISTIAN BELIEF AND WORLD RELIGIONS (2004).

